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The Shape of Things

THE FALL OF ROSTOV IS A HEAVY BLOW to the cause of the United Nations, and even worse is the establishment of German bridgeheads on the lower Don, where it was hoped Marshal Timoshenko would be able to build a solid defense line. Hitler is dangerously near to achieving his immediate objective of cutting off the Caucasus with its vital oil and food supplies from the rest of Russia. It is not surprising, therefore, that the agitation for an immediate second front should be rising in a crescendo, particularly in Britain, where it appears to be getting on the government's nerves. In so far as the fervent demand for action indicates a willingness to face the enormous losses which the successful establishment of a second front will involve, this agitation is a healthy sign. On the other hand, it is obvious that whatever action the British and American High Commands have planned for the next two months must have been decided upon weeks ago, since even a small overseas expedition requires meticulous preparation. There are some indications that the next step will be a great intensification of air attacks on Germany. Experts like Major Seversky may well be over-optimistic in believing that the bomber alone can knock out the Axis; but a steady succession of raids, on a greater scale than anything Germany achieved over England, could do much to soften German morale and disrupt communications and production. There could be no better preparation for a later invasion of the Continent.

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ARGENTINA HAS GONE A STEP FARTHER IN its double policy of supporting the Axis and repressing all dissident liberal opinion. Señor Ruiz Guiñazú's violent anti-American speech in the secret meeting of the Chamber of Deputies served as a cynical commentary on a government prone to boast of its immaculate neutrality. The curious and round-about repudiation of this speech, issued through the Argentine Embassy in Mexico, convinces us only that the Foreign Minister, on second thought, concluded that the word *recua* (a drove of beasts of burden), applied to the American republics which have chosen to follow Washington rather than Berlin, was not, from the point of view of protocol, a happy choice. So officially at least it was never spoken.

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But viewing the incident unofficially, we are prepared to accept the original report of the secret meeting presented in the uncensored press of Montevideo by members of the Argentine parliamentary opposition. We are the more inclined to take their word for what was said when we note how closely it parallels every other act of the Castillo government. Within the last few days the Minister of the Interior has decreed the suspension of three more newspapers sympathetic to the cause of the United Nations and has seized all available copies of "Campo Minado" (Minefield), in which the former deputy, Adolfo Lanús, a member of the committee of investigation into anti-Argentine activities, describes most impressively his experiences in dealing with Nazi intrigues in his country. Castillo cannot afford to have the public know to what extent his pro-Axis policy has opened the doors of Argentina to the political invasion of Adolf Hitler.

*

THE NEW YORK *WORLD-TELEGRAM* SHOWED peculiar editorial judgment in featuring with banner headlines a story on the increase in strikes on the same day that it printed in a far less prominent position a WPB forecast of curtailed production in many directions due to shortages of materials. The *World-Telegram* pointed out that a million man-days had been lost through strikes since January 1, or enough time to produce 200 tanks. We hold no brief for labor walkouts at this time, but the toll they are taking in production is small compared with that caused by shortages of material, particularly steel. Two years ago government experts foresaw that our steel-making capacity would prove inadequate under total war conditions, but their plans for expansion were drastically cut down owing to opposition within the industry. Now we find that while astonishing progress has been made in stepping up output of war goods, we are having to allow machines and skilled hands to remain idle because the steel mills cannot keep up with demand. As a result the program for 200 badly needed ships has been scrapped—a loss far more serious than that of 200 tanks. Moreover, it appears that an over-all shortage of steel is being accentuated by uneven allocations. According to evidence presented to a subcommittee of the House Marine and Fisheries Committee, "some old-line shipyards, subsidiaries of the old steel trust, had inventories out of proportion to their normal needs. If this steel had been properly allocated and distributed, there would have been sufficient available to carry out the whole program of 1942 and 1943, including the Higgins contract." These charges deserve a full and open investigation.

*

THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE MADE A poor start on the task of improving the tax bill passed by the House when it rejected out of hand two Treasury proposals for increasing revenue. In his statement to the committee last week Mr. Morgenthau drew attention to three groups of taxpayers enjoying "special privileges." The existence of $14 billion worth of tax-exempt securities, he pointed out, opens a wide breach in our system of taxation in accordance with ability to pay. He quoted the case of an individual with a gross income of $975,000, of which more than two-thirds is derived from tax-exempts. Under the House bill this multimillionaire will pay a tax of only $243,000, whereas if the privilege of tax exemption were removed, he would be liable for $832,000. There is general agreement that tax-exempts are an anomaly in a progressive system, but the fact that existing issues were sold on this contractual basis does create a legal obstacle to their abolition. The desired result, however, could be approximately arrived at if Congress adopted the President's suggestion that all incomes be limited to $25,000 for the duration of the war. Unfortunately, the Senate Finance Committee has turned down the proposal to end the tax-exempt privilege and has also refused to consider Mr. Morgenthau's recommendation of mandatory joint income-tax returns for married couples. The question of abolishing the 27½ per cent depletion allowance enjoyed by mining and oil properties, no matter how long they remain productive, the third proposal of the Secretary of the Treasury, has been left open.

*

TWENTY-EIGHT PETTY TROUBLE-MAKERS know now that American democracy is not too flabby to swish the flies off its back. After eleven months of patient investigation, in which 150 witnesses were heard and 6,880 pages of testimony recorded, William P. Maloney and John T. M. Reddan, special assistants to the Attorney General, have brought in their catch. A more unsavory mess hasn't been hauled in since the round-up of the Mafia. Here are the scheming little merchants of hate whose names have figured in exposure after exposure in the liberal press over the past ten years. Winrod, Griffin, and Pelley; Dilling, Hudson, and Edmundson; Jones, True, Noble, Smythe, and the rest are all to be confronted in a court of law with the words they hoped would weaken the country and perhaps bring them to power: "the Axis powers are fighting to free the world from domination by communism and international Jewry"; "the Japanese war against China is morally right"; "the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor was instigated by Great Britain"; this is a war in defense of "international Jewry-organized finance," of "British imperialists' and "Mongolian Jews," and so forth *ad nauseam*. We do not wish to seem grudging in praise of Mr. Maloney's catch, but it does appear that some of the larger fish are yet to be netted. There is the Coughlin agent in Boston who, after Pearl Harbor, mailed thousands of letters to men in the camps assailing the President as a "murderer"; there is the Senator who on the

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side publishes a journal hardly less slimy than those on the prosecutor's list. And whatever became of the projected probe of those responsible for *Social Justice?* If it was barred from the mails for being "clearly seditious," surely its editors and guiding spirit are not above investigation.

*

THE RESIGNATION OF TIBOR ECKHARDT AS leader of the Independent Hungary group and the subsequent dissolution of the group itself have caused an elation in some liberal circles which we are unable to share. What is in the wind, apparently, is a reorganization under the auspices of a number of Hungarian ex-diplomats, including Anton Balasy, former counselor of the Hungarian legation in Washington, with a view to obtaining the support of the Association of Democratic Hungarians, led by Rustem Vambery. A respectable cloak for the new setup is to be provided by giving nominal leadership to Bela Bartok, who is being billed as the "Hungarian Paderewski." This unoriginal design is to be credited to the British Foreign Office, but the cutting and finishing are being performed by Harold B. Hoskins of our own State Department, who had previously done his best to disguise Eckhardt's feudal past in democratic homespun. The attempt failed because the odor of the anti-Semitic "Awakening Magyars" clung to the new garments. But even if Mr. Eckhardt has really been dropped, we should examine very carefully the credentials of the self-appointed guides of Bela Bartok, who is entirely without political experience. Before their organization is afforded any kind of recognition they should be required to give proof both that they have shed all allegiance to the Horthy regime and that their democratic sentiments are something more than a concession to American opinion.

The Old Deal Looks to 1944

WE HAVE seldom encountered anything more revealing than the outburst of editorial hypocrisy which followed Senator Mead's decision to seek, with the President's blessing, the gubernatorial nomination in the New York Democratic primaries. Solemn lectures were read to Mr. Roosevelt about the wickedness of "politics as usual." His only business, he was told, was to get on with running the war, letting the political chips fall where they would. Clearly somebody's plans had been seriously upset by Mr. Roosevelt's action.

In their eagerness to censure the President, the anti-New Deal editorial writers and columnists chose to overlook the fact that he is not only Chief Executive but head of his party. Our own criticism of Mr. Roosevelt is that he has been wrong to pretend he had no vital interest in the New York elections and that he ought not to have waited for the eleventh hour before coming into the open. Under our democratic system politics are the legitimate means of making ideas effective, and since Mr. Roosevelt's ideas are shared by vast numbers of his fellow-citizens he has not only a right but a duty to attempt to implement them.

Everyone knows that the contest in New York is not primarily between Mead and Bennett but between Roosevelt and Farley, between the New Deal and the Old Deal. And the stakes are not the nomination for governor but control of the state delegation in 1944. Mr. Roosevelt has a vital interest in the nomination of his successor in the White House because he properly wants to see his policies continued in the crucial years after the war. And his opponents have every right to strive by political means to thwart his efforts—but let them not pretend that their virtue is his sin.

It cannot be denied that while the President has been absorbed by war problems the Old Dealers have been playing politics as usual and have hatched out a very pretty plot providing them with a two-way bet. Their Republican wing, without consulting the wishes of Wendell Willkie, titular party leader, has little Tom Dewey lined up as its candidate for the New York governorship—a safe man, willing to take orders from Herbert Hoover and Roy Howard and to accept Westbrook Pegler as unofficial publicity agent. On the Democratic side Mr. Farley, no doubt in consultation with the Southern Democrats who supported him for the Presidential nomination in 1940, has been busy garnering pledges for his boy Bennett, hoping that the only business of the state convention would be to ratify his choice.

If both Dewey and Bennett are nominated, it will matter little to the Old Dealers which man wins. Bennett's victory would leave Farley in full control of the Democratic state machine and probably enable him, in cooperation with his friends from the poll-tax belt, to name the next Democratic candidate for President. On the other hand, a Republican victory would place Dewey in an excellent position in 1944 to take the prize which eluded his grasp in 1940. Thus either way the Old Dealers would be sure of a White House amenable to instructions during the critical post-war years.

This is a plot which must be thwarted if America is not to be swamped by a wave of reaction. The drafting of Senator Mead is a first step. Now rank-and-file Democratic and labor voters, whose ballots for years have made New York the spearhead of the New Deal, must raise their voices, must strive to cut the delegates out of the bag into which Mr. Farley has sewn them so tightly. But they must work fast, for the time available is woefully short.

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The President's Advisers

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

IF THE appointment of Admiral Leahy and the speech of Secretary Hull had come at any other time than last week they would have been easier to stand. Worse choices and speeches have often been made. But taken in conjunction with the agony of Russia's slow fighting retreat across the Don with all it implies of danger to the Allied cause, these two minor incidents took on major significance. Here, at the most threatening crisis of the war, was alarming evidence of the weakness and contradictory purposes that still infect our national policies.

Of course Mr. Roosevelt needs help and advice. He shoulders an impossible burden of responsibility and actual direction. If Admiral Leahy can serve as a useful assistant, there is no reason on earth why he should not be the chief of staff to the Commander-in-Chief. But if his appointment is designed to obviate the need for a General Staff, or to silence demands for one, it must be strongly condemned. In discussing the appointment the President implied that Leahy's job would be largely technical and advisory. All right. If this is true, the need for a unification of control in a staff representing both military and political branches remains as urgent as ever. If this is not true, if Admiral Leahy is to have any over-all executive power, then the appointment is most disturbing.

One of the early comments on the choice of Leahy pointed out that his experience as American ambassador at Vichy would be of utmost value now that the question of a second front had become paramount. It attributed to the Admiral "an intimate knowledge of the vast 'V' army among the French population, which is expected to rise and join hands with the Anglo-American army of liberation." What a pleasant fantasy to weave about the appointment of a man whose knowledge of the forces of resistance in France was gained as envoy to a government devoted assiduously to the stamping out of resistance, a man who supported Pétain and, even after the accession to power of Laval, argued against a break with Vichy! How is such a man to advise the President on the political forces which must join with the military for an offensive action in the West? Will he even support an invasion of France? To do so would be to acknowledge the failure of the policy he advised and helped to carry out. Never has Admiral Leahy shown any sign of that profound political comprehension which is an absolute necessity in plotting major strategy in Europe today.

What the President needs to fortify him in his overwhelming task as Commander-in-Chief is a staff which will combine the best military and naval brains of the services with political astuteness and an intimate understanding of the forces at work in the Europe of today and tomorrow. And the political members of such a united high command must not be afraid of the word revolution.

But if the appointment of Leahy created doubts, Hull's speech multiplied them. What good words can one find to describe the vast, dull reaches of this endless address? Noble, perhaps, or well-intentioned. It was general to the point of evaporation. Delivered at a moment when the people of the world crave firmness and clear-cut direction, its soft, hazy contours offered no substance, nothing to grasp, certainly nothing to fight for. Instead of carefully combing the speech for quotable excerpts, Goebbels could have issued it in full as a classic example of democratic vagueness.

Above all, the speech was full of obvious inner contradictions. In one breath the Secretary of State urged the solemn truth that "liberty is truly won only when it is guarded with the same watchfulness, the same courage, the same willingness to fight for it which first secured it." And he drew the obvious conclusion that nations which have forgotten this have "been surprised and unprepared" when the inevitable attack came. But then, several breaths farther along, with equal solemnity he patted the United States on the back—for what? For preparing to fight for our threatened liberties? For defending those nations which had been made the victims of unprovoked aggression? Not at all. Such was not the policy pursued by Mr. Hull's department. "From the time when the first signs of menace to the peace of the world appeared on the horizon," said Mr. Hull, "the government of the United States strove unceasingly to promote peace on the solid foundation of law, justice, non-intervention [remember Spain?], non-aggression, and international collaboration." But war came anyhow. And as soon as hostilities broke out, "our government made every honorable and feasible effort to prevent spread of the conflicts and to safeguard this country against being drawn into war." But war came to America, too, and also took it by surprise. Was our effort to keep out more realistic than that of other countries? Was this the example Mr. Hull wants to hold up to the desperate peoples of Europe, whom he invites so warmly to rebellion?

Fortunately, the strength and political wisdom of the nation are not to be measured by these words or by the capacity of Mr. Hull or Admiral Leahy. It is clear that the President himself realizes fully the significance of the Russia retreat. More and more evidence accumulates to indicate that a second front is probable, and may be opened within a few weeks. The desirability of such a move has been evident since long before the German offensive began, but only recently have high officials indicated that enough ships and equipment could be mustered to make it possible. But if a second front is actually in the making, all the more is it important that the President surround himself with a staff fully capable of waging a war which to succeed must at the same time be a political revolution.

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A People's War—or Monopoly's?

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, July 26

IT IS painful to hear the slogan of a people's war raised by Cox of Georgia. "This bill"—for a Farm Rubber Agency—Cox told the House on Friday, "is in response to public demand for a broadening of the synthetic-rubber program. This is still a people's government, fighting a people's war." Those who have been watching the rubber program know that the first sentence in Cox's statement is literally true, though there is more wish than fulfilment in the second. Nowhere is the difference between a democratic and a monopolistic effort more clearly displayed than in the handling of rubber, and the President's decision to sign or veto the bill will reflect (1) his own comprehension of what a people's war really means and (2) the extent to which a people's war is possible in a monopoly-dominated America.

The bill was written by the five members of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry—Senators Gillette, Norris, McNary, Wheeler, and Elmer Thomas. It represents the fruit of the investigation this subcommittee has been making since March 20 to discover how the war program can use farm products. Though it had only $5,000 to spend and has spent less than $2,000, and though its energetic counsel, Paul E. Hadlick, has had a staff consisting of one girl typist, it has taught us more about the problem of rubber and other synthetics than any other committee here. The bill written by this committee would set up a separate agency to arrange for the production of synthetic rubber from farm and forest products. And its purpose in establishing a separate agency, in the words of Senator Norris, is to see that the program is "carried out by men who are friends of it, and not those who have thrown cold water on it always in the past."

The truth is that our failure adequately to utilize all our sources of rubber does not differ fundamentally from our failure to achieve a total effort in steel, copper, aluminum, or magnesium. The difference is that opposition to the mishandling in those fields has come from labor unions, scattered small business men, and some independent engineers. In the case of rubber, the oil-rubber-chemical-alcohol combine has come up against a large and powerful segment of the property-owning classes themselves—the farmers. In that sense rubber from farm alcohol is, indeed, what the New York *Herald Tribune* recently called it, "political rubber." But what that organ intended as a sneer may be taken as an accolade, for here the processes of political democracy are at work to give us the rubber we need by the shortest, best, and cheapest route. If rubber from farm alcohol is "political rubber," then most of the rubber on order today in the $650,000,000 WPB-RFC program is "monopoly rubber," "Standard Oil rubber."

Few people yet realize that rubber from petroleum has never been manufactured on a commercial scale anywhere in the world, that the German Buna process which I. G. Farben never fully revealed to its subservient cartel partner, Standard Oil, is not a process for making rubber from oil. It is a process for making rubber from coal. The only process for making synthetic rubber which has been successfully used is the process for making it from grain alcohol, as the Russians are still doing and as the Poles did before their defeat. It was a shortage of grain, even more than a shortage of petroleum, which led the Germans to seek their rubber from coal gases. Standard Oil and its satellites and allies are now engaged in the difficult task of applying what they know of that German process to petroleum gases—the same gases we need for our aviation-gasoline program.

Ignorance, insincerity, and duplicity—it will be some time before we know the exact proportions of each—have mingled in the making of the present program. Although rubber from alcohol is an old story to chemists, the WPB was blanketed in official ignorance of its very existence until a few months ago when the Gillette subcommittee began its work. Under pressure from that committee it has now been decided to make 200,000 tons of our 800,000-ton program from alcohol, but the entire quota has been assigned to Union Carbide and Carbon, an ally of Standard Oil and part of the inner chemical ring. Union Carbide makes synthetic, not grain, alcohol and turns it into rubber by a variant of the oldest Russian method, a complicated four-step process long since improved in the Soviet Union. Today there are processes available in laboratories run by the Department of Agriculture and state colleges in Nebraska and Iowa which can produce butadiene—the raw material of Buna-type rubber—much more quickly and efficiently. The inventor of the Polish process is operating a pilot plant for a one-step process at the Publicker Alcohol Plant in Philadelphia, and the newer butylene-glycol process—an American discovery—skips the alcohol stage entirely.

Far more than rubber is involved in this struggle. The surpluses from our farms, the sulphite waste that flows from our pulp mills, the very husks of corn and hulls of oats contain countless wonders to which organic chemistry already holds the key. The alcohol, glycol, and furfural which chemists can derive from them are the materials from which we can draw fuels to replace our limited supplies of petroleum, plastics to replace our metals, and synthetics better than natural rubber. Here lies the solution of farm surpluses and the farm problem, but here also lies the death of the oil, rubber, chemical, and alcohol trusts. That's what all the shootin's for.

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The Battle of Oil

BY HAROLD L. ICKES

SO FAR as my information goes, this war has not been officially christened. The last report was that the search was on for a name that would at the same time identify the war and forever remind us that it must never be permitted to happen again. The person who submits the suggestion that is generally accepted may get his name in the newspapers or even in the history books.

One thing that we do know is that several wars within *the* war are raging daily and that these "second fronts" are already pretty well named for posterity. There are the Battle of Production, the Battle of Rubber, the Battle of Oil, and many others.

Yes, the Battle of Oil, with which I am principally familiar, is a war within the war, and it is one of major importance. The Battle of Production is being won, but the Battle of Oil, as well as the Battle of Rubber, is still in the fluid stage, with pincer movements and attempted encirclements of daily occurrence. As this is written, the Nazis are pushing on toward the Caucasus oil fields; should they reach them and put them to work, Russia's mechanized strength would be crippled and the Nazis' own prospects greatly improved. It would be a telling blow to all the United Nations.

In our own case, the fight is of another but nevertheless a desperate sort. With us it has not been a question of supply. We still lead the world in production, although the rest of the world has much more oil in reserve than we have. This I have tried by every conceivable means to make clear. With us the question is how to get petroleum products from where they are to where they are needed. When I was appointed Petroleum Coordinator toward the end of May, 1941, the situation had become serious, chiefly by reason of the necessary diversion of oil tankers to Britain.

The first effects of these diversions were felt in our reserve centers. The direct effect on the individual, perhaps unfortunately for the country, was not immediately noticeable. The daily supply of petroleum was apparently as plentiful as ever. I can understand, therefore, why the average motorist refused to let himself get excited when he was told that a shortage was just around the pump, all set to stick its tongue out at him if he didn't economize in his driving. But I shall never be able to understand, nor shall I be quick to forgive, the newspapers that told the motorist to travel as usual, on the wholly untenable ground that our petroleum supplies were the most plentiful in the world, and without end. This never has been true of our reserves, though we have made more oil available to consumers than the rest of the world.

Had we been given the cooperation then that we are getting now—although even now there are mole-like exceptions—the oil crisis of today might have been deferred, and in the interlude we might have been spared the inconvenience and annoyance of rationing. Also the contribution to victory would have been worth while.

The danger of exhausting our reserve supplies in above-ground storage was what practical oil men foresaw first, and acting upon their expert advice, the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator tried valiantly, though in vain, to lessen consumption. We couldn't, with prudence, permit this above-ground storage to get too low, and it was clear that only by using less could we prevent an over-drain upon our storage tanks. With daily movements from the oil fields seriously interfered with by reduced shipments over the water routes, it became necessary to make up the difference out of the reserves if the daily demand of individuals was to be satisfied. But if reserves are drawn down day after day and week after week, there will come a time when there won't be any reserves, and then, with a scarcity of transportation, will come confusion and a serious curtailment that, like rain, will fall upon just and unjust users alike.

Meanwhile reserves in the Atlantic States kept falling lower and lower. From a high of 82,000,000 barrels on December 1 they fell to a low of 46,488,000 barrels on April 11. Since then we have not given out the figures for military reasons, but citizens may rest assured that the situation did not suddenly and drastically improve. Some relief was felt when railroad tank-car movements increased and a few of the borrowed tankers were returned to us by England, whereupon the newspapers, with the motorists echoing them, labeled it "Ickes's phony oil shortage" and filed the whole thing away under "finished business." But the relief was purely ephemeral. Individuals continued to burn as much as they ever did, although less regular gasoline was being produced in order that we might produce more aviation and industrial fuels. The problem of how to transport enough heating oil to keep everybody warm next winter then began to show its ugly head. On top of all else, it was clearly demonstrated by the continued decline in reserves that the railroads' boasted best was not nearly good enough. Then, and not until then, was belated but nevertheless welcome consideration given to additional pipeline transportation.

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The Ickes pipe dream, better known to the trade as the "Ickes pipe line," has begun to come true. The first of the new lines now under record-speed construction between Texas and Illinois will be opened for business, we hope, some time within the next four months, and when the flow starts it should alleviate, although it will not overcome, the scarcity of heating oil in the Atlantic States. In addition, old lines are being relaid to carry more oil east. I have just seen the first of the new giant tubes "come off the line" at Lorain, Ohio.

The inevitable rationing was sneaking up on the people while they stubbornly refused to envisage the danger, and for their obscurantism I hold the newspapers almost entirely responsible. They may disclaim it loudly or hide in the tombs of silence, but the fact is clear that the shortage was intensified and accelerated by the editors who refused to apply their reasoning powers to a problem that their eyes couldn't actually see. "Intellectuals" all!

I wish that I might feel sure that, with continued and increased railroad tank-car shipments, which have pretty nearly reached their capacity, with an increased movement of oil by means of new and relaid pipe lines, with added barges, we could overcome fully the loss of tankers resulting from diversions and submarine sinkings. I do not consider it wise to count upon tanker transportation of petroleum to our East Coast states. We are hoping that this may be resumed, but we can't be sure, and so we do not add to our figures what might possibly accrue to our supplies from this source.

Washington officials have been freely and, I may say, often unfairly set upon for the manner in which gasoline rationing was imposed in the first instance. I do not offer it as an excuse, but it should be obvious to any fair-minded person that the job of distributing millions of barrels of petroleum products to 33,000,000 motorists, not to mention millions of truck owners, of meeting the demands of the government in the prosecution of the war, and at the same time of keeping our home fires burning is no mean one. Moreover, it was not a job for which we had ever had a precedent or previous training. Add to all this the outcropping of abuse by newspapers, some of which I sometimes think would not be overwhelmed by a complete breakdown of our war effort, and the resulting situation was by no stretch of the imagination a simple one. A serious rubber shortage has made the gasoline situation still more complex.

For all its many troublesome angles, the problem will be well on the way to a satisfactory resolution just as soon as the car owners of the nation get down to the job of beating it, and the car owners will get down to this job just as soon as they realize the full extent of their responsibility. At this juncture, the newspapers have their chance to make amends for their lack of foresight and their bullyragging tactics of a year ago.

Who Is the State Department?

II. THE OLD WELLES AND THE NEW

BY ROBERT BENDINER

TO CRITICS of the snobbish caste traditions of the State Department, Sumner Welles seems to offer a perfect target. In temperament, which is austere and formal, if not downright chilling; in background, which is wealthy and aristocratic; in sartorial appearance, which is fastidious and soberly elegant; and in political philosophy as well, he is at opposite poles from his chief. The feuding Tennessee frontier of Hull's boyhood is replaced by the stuffy affluence of the home of a successful financier in the New York of the nineties; a financier of lineage as well as wealth, a member of that same New York aristocracy that produced the Roosevelts. The Welleses and the Roosevelts, in fact, crossed paths long before Franklin D. appointed Sumner to his Little Cabinet. Eleanor Roosevelt and Sumner Welles shared the same godmother, and as a boy of thirteen Welles served as a page at the future President's wedding. The tie assumes some importance, by no means decisive, in explaining the President's loyalty to the subordinate who has borne the brunt of the criticism directed against the State Department.

Groton and Harvard were inevitable for young Welles. He appears to have gone through school with characteristic sobriety and aloofness. A snob perhaps but never a playboy, Welles seems always to have been mature beyond his years. He determined while at school to prepare for the Foreign Service, worked hard at languages and economics, and, with the best of connections, found no difficulty in being admitted. From the start he was convinced that Latin America would be supremely important in the years to come, and while other budding diplomats asked, futilely enough, to be sent to Paris or to London, he requested a South American capital for his first assignment. The department sent him to Tokyo instead, where he worked up a thoroughgoing dislike for the Japanese, but after two years it relented

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and shifted him to Buenos Aires. In 1920 he was brought back to Washington to serve as assistant chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, and a year later, despite the political change in administration, he became at twenty-eight the youngest division chief in the history of the department. His interest has been fixed on Latin America ever since.

As a prodigiously hard-working chief of staff, eager to assume the powers so readily relinquished by Hull, Welles has been the guiding spirit of the department. He sees the President even more frequently than the Secretary does, and diplomats, valuing his acute and precise comments, prefer discussions with him to those with his vaguer and somewhat rambling superior. Welles is thus accountable for much of the department's record, even though his chief interest has been Latin America.

In general he has taken a more realistic attitude toward the Axis than has Hull. He is credited with having stiffened Ambassador Grew's hand in Tokyo on more than one occasion, and his comparatively friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union over a long period of time stemmed from a desire to checkmate the Japanese. He favored Russian recognition from the start, was convinced that the Soviet-German pact would prove to be of short duration, and did his best to warn the Russian ambassador in Washington of impending Nazi treachery. On the other hand, he shares responsibility with Hull for the fatuousness of the Vichy policy, and despite his reputed personal inclinations, he sided with the embargo forces in the Spanish war—largely with an eye on the pro-Franco dictators of Latin America, whose friendship he so earnestly courted as a Good Neighbor.

Like Hull, Welles has never showed the slightest sympathy for fascism—except the Brazilian variety—and in his icy way he has been at even less pains to conceal his scorn and contempt. If Hans Thomsen of the German Embassy had gone to Hull with his protest when Secretary Ickes excoriated the Führer he would merely have been told, as often before, that the United States is a democracy and its citizens enjoy the right of free speech; he went instead to Welles, who chilled him to the bone with the brusque information that the Ickes speech accurately reflected the views of the American people and their government.

Nevertheless, it was not until the speech he delivered at Arlington on May 30, 1942, that Welles presented himself as a champion of democracy. His opposition to the Axis had always had a quality of nationalism about it. Like Churchill he appeared to be an intelligent Tory, aware that fascism represented a menace to a society which he found good and which he had no desire to modify in any way. In a limited sense Welles's nationalism, whatever its social implications, was a better antidote to appeasement tendencies than the liberal but curiously archaic type of internationalism represented by Cordell Hull; just as Churchill's imperial instincts were a better safeguard for England in the teeth of the fascist gale than the vapid pacifism of the Lansburys or the trading instincts of the Chamberlains. But Churchill would not have turned the tide of the war on the basis of an aristocratic nationalism, and neither can America fight a people's war purely on the basis of national self-interest. There are bigger issues at stake.

At Arlington Welles demonstrated his awareness of this major truth. Only six weeks before, he had told the Vichy Ambassador that "the government of the United States fervently hopes that it may see the reestablishment of the independence of France and of the integrity of French territory" and that it recognized the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France over their territory and possessions. The pronouncement, reasonably enough, was taken as an indication that the government, or at least the State Department, favored a restoration of the pre-war colonial system. In the Arlington speech Welles spoke in a different vein. "If this war," he said, "is in fact a war for the liberation of peoples, it must assure the sovereign equality of peoples throughout the world, as well as in the world of the Americas. Our victory must bring in its train the liberation of all peoples. . . . The age of imperialism is ended. The right of a people to their freedom must be recognized." Moreover, he warned, "the selfishness of small groups" would not be allowed to block the "new frontier of human welfare."

These are words, however brave and timely, and words are the commonest coin of diplomacy. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to judge them against earlier words and the actions that flowed out of them.

Welles's first years in the department were marked by swift success and gradual development. Throughout Harding's Administration and part of Coolidge's, he carried out a number of delicate missions in Central America, working in close collaboration with Secretary of State Hughes, who has always been something of a hero to him, but slowly he grew more skeptical of the old-line Republican techniques of dollar diplomacy. As high commissioner to the Dominican Republic from 1922 to 1925, he successfully pressed Hughes for the withdrawal of the marines, the first step in clearing the Caribbean of American soldiery. Friction with President Coolidge brought about his retirement in 1925, and except for a brief mission to the Dominican Republic in 1929 he remained out of public life until the election of Roosevelt.

The period of retirement was extremely important to the Welles career. He had spent ten years in the service and developed some marked ideas on what the future course of policy toward Latin America should be. The ideas took the ponderous form of a two-volume work called "Naboth's Vineyard," a history of Santo Domingo, and

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they represented a drastic change from the concepts that Welles had put forth in the early days of his service. In 1924 he had written an article for the *Atlantic Monthly* in which he belittled the extent of dollar diplomacy and, at a time when Washington interference in the Caribbean was at a peak, compared Latin American critics of the United States "to those groups in our own country who promote racial or religious antagonism for their own ends." Conceding that "mistakes undoubtedly have been committed," he maintained that "our record in general has been one with which every American citizen may well be content." And in recommending the policy to be followed he wrote that the United States must be "ready to assume the responsibility of offering its friendly mediations or, in extreme cases, *its friendly intervention* [author's italics], should conditions be such as to threaten a national or international conflagration" endangering "the policy of self-protection of the United States known as the Monroe Doctrine."

From this brave shouldering of the white man's burden to the thesis of "Naboth's Vineyard" is a far cry. The conclusion of that standard work on the Dominican Republic is a full statement of what Welles himself was one day to christen the Good Neighbor policy. A few excerpts will convey the flavor of the new doctrine:

> It was in the following Taft Administration, under the guidance of Secretary Knox, that there first became noted that pernicious phase of the Latin American policy of the United States which consisted in the attempt to intervene in the affairs of the Caribbean republics in order to force upon the inhabitants of those countries governments considered by the Department of State in Washington suited to their requirements, regardless of whether or not the people of the nations concerned had a real voice in their selection. . . .
>
> It was inevitable under such conditions that any government in one of those republics which favored American commercial expansion must necessarily become identified in the eyes of the Department of State with a government suitable and proper for the people of that republic. . . .
>
> Until the moment arrives when the average American appreciates the fact that friendly cooperation and intercourse, both political and commercial, with the other American republics constitutes the future safeguard and the fundamental advantage of the United States, . . . no healthy established continental policy will ever be maintained, and the United States will continue to remain alienated from the other republics of the hemisphere.

Nor was the Welles of "Naboth's Vineyard" hazy as to the outlines of a "healthy established continental policy." It is only in the "stimulation of commercial ties, in the facilitation of educational advantages to students from the southern republics, in the limitation of financing to productive purposes, in the proffer of technical and expert assistance when it may be needed," he wrote, "that the United States will obtain the results desired, and not through military occupation, military intervention, or armed supervision of elections."

What are the "results desired"? Hostile critics insist that the Welles policy is imperialism in disguise, that it aims at control over the other countries of the hemisphere by means less brutal and more effective than crude interventionism. On the evidence of the book itself this interpretation seems unduly harsh and suspicious. In the light of Welles's subsequent record, caution, at least, would appear to be warranted.

Sumner Welles

Throughout the Hoover Administration Welles remained in obscurity, awaiting the opportunity to put his new thesis to the test. In the interval he was divorced from his first wife and married Mathilde Townsend, an extremely wealthy Marylander, formerly the wife of Senator Gerry of Rhode Island. With the Townsend fortune came a great mansion on Massachusetts Avenue and Oxon Hill Manor, a magnificent 220-acre country estate in Maryland.

The opportunity came with the nomination of Franklin D. Roosevelt. At the convention of 1932 Welles, now become a full-fledged Democrat, had a major hand in shaping the planks on foreign affairs, and he worked for the nomination of his old friend. After the victory at Chicago he contributed generously to the Roosevelt campaign fund, and in March of the following year he reaped his reward in the form of an assistant secretaryship in the State Department.

Within a month Welles made his first essay as a Good Neighbor. Even by his own standards it was a dismal failure, and though it accomplished one laudable purpose it doused whatever Latin American hopes had been generated by the Good Neighbor promises written into the President's inaugural by Welles himself. The scene of the experiment was Cuba, and the purpose of the mission—Welles was almost immediately converted into an ambassador—was to bring order out of the chaos produced by Machado, a dictator whose corruption had brought Cuba to the brink of revolution and had, more than incidentally, endangered American interests on the island. Welles was to mediate between Machado and the leaders of the opposition, obtain certain urgent reforms, and thus avert bloodshed and the possibilities of revolu-

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tionary change. Mediation with Machado was a sham from the start, and Welles soon found himself laying down terms which no dictator could accept. To forestall more drastic developments Welles selected the weak Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as the next President of Cuba and proceeded to undermine the Machado regime by the time-worn methods of imperialist pressure. It was all sanctioned by the Platt Amendment, a section of the Cuban constitution which gave the United States the privilege of intervening in Cuban affairs for the protection of "life, property, and individual liberty."

Welles had at first enjoyed the support of the opposition groups, and his efforts at mediating their differences with the dictatorship were heartily indorsed. But with the installation of Cespedes, the applause came from a different quarter. Cespedes gave promise of combining Machado politics with a greater degree of sensitivity to American interests, and Welles found himself lauded by Cuban representatives of the United Fruit Company, by American utilities executives in Havana, and by the American Chamber of Commerce in Cuba. But popular feeling turned sharply against him. If there was no doubt that the Cuban people wanted to get rid of Machado, there was every doubt that they wanted Cespedes. Welles was adamant and backed his man in the face of a rising movement headed by the liberal Grau San Martín. The movement proved stronger than Welles, and within two weeks, before Welles could even receive the promised Grand Cross of the Order of Carlos, Cespedes fell. The Cuban revolution rolled on.

What followed cannot be squared with a Good Neighbor policy of any description. At Welles's insistence recognition was denied the Grau San Martín government, credits were held up, American warships steamed south, and despite the break in relations Welles stayed on, converting the American Embassy into a center of intrigue against the regime. It was futile for Grau to ask Roosevelt for the envoy's recall, because the President, backing Welles, refused to recognize Grau's existence. The result was that widespread demonstrations broke out in Havana. Mobs shouted "Down with Sumner Welles," "Down with Yankee imperialism." The creator of the Good Neighbor policy, hooted in the streets of Havana and hanged in effigy, finally withdrew, but his continued pressure, exercised from afar, finally brought about the downfall of the Grau government.

It was a wretched experience, and Welles's supporters insist that he himself now believes he was wrong, though he is too proud to acknowledge it. The one good outcome of the affair was the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, which Welles brought about in the spring of 1934. In long-range terms this move was ample recompense to the Cubans. Extinguishing the last pretense to the legality of intervention in Latin American affairs, it enabled Welles successfully to live down the woeful start he had made in promoting the Good Neighbor doctrine.

Since the disastrous Cuban episode Welles has made non-interference the keystone of his policy, and in the case of Brazil at least it is not unfair to suggest that he has leaned over backward. When Vargas established his totalitarian regime in Rio de Janeiro, it would have been one thing for Welles to explain to the country that the Washington government was no longer engaged in the business of setting up and knocking down the governments of less powerful sovereign states. He might even have strengthened his case by admitting he had been wrong in the Cuban affair and avowing his intention to steer clear of such practices in the future. But surely there was no need to indorse a regime just then engaged in conducting a reign of terror that would have done Mussolini proud in the heyday of his glory. Sumner Welles, by now Under Secretary, did just that.

> Only a few weeks ago there took place in one of the greatest republics of the world, the United States of Brazil [he announced at the height of the terror], a change in the governmental structure of that nation. . . . We too often forget here in the United States that, with the exception of our neighbor Canada, the other great independent nations of the New World spring from a heritage which is different from ours, have inherited certain concepts of government and of law which are divergent from ours, are the product of a civilization distinct from, although quite as advanced and quite as admirable as, the Anglo-Saxon civilization from which we ourselves derive—and very naturally by consequence employ in the solution of their national problems methods which at times are distinct from those which we ourselves employ in striving toward objectives which may in turn be quite the same as theirs.

Welles's relations with the Vargas regime, taken together with the Cuban affair, reveal him as an international politician rather than a homey Good Neighbor, as a tactician, sometimes shrewd and sometimes not so shrewd, rather than a political philosopher. It is hard to down the suspicion that his current emphasis on "the frontier of human welfare" stems at least in part from the pressures of the war and the competition of rival government agencies.

The record is mixed, and Sumner Welles himself remains something of an enigma. Clearly he is not the simple moneyed snob that his critics see in him, but neither is it to be wondered at if his Arlington speech puzzled a country that had never before seen in him the sympathetic understanding, the human warmth, and the militant spirit needed to inform a people's war and inspire a people's peace.

[*"The Assistant Secretariat"—A. A. Berle, Breckinridge Long, Dean Acheson, and G. Howland Shaw—is the subject of the third article of this series, to appear next week.*]

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Rebuilding the Danube Basin

BY ANTONIN BASCH

[*Perhaps the most critical economic and political problems of the post-war period will find their focus in the reconstruction of Central and Southeastern Europe. A discussion of some of those problems by Milan Hodza, conservative agrarian leader and former Premier of Czecho-Slovakia, appeared in* The Nation *of May 16. A strongly contrasting view is presented in the following article by a leading Czech economist. Still another analysis, more strictly political, by Rustem Vambery, Hungarian democratic leader, will appear in an early issue.*]

TWO problems must be kept in mind in discussing the economic reconstruction of Central and Southeastern Europe. Along with the vast task of immediate post-war relief it will be necessary to grapple with the even more important duty of developing a long-range political and economic program for the consolidation and development of this area, which contains more than one-third of the territory and one-fourth of the population of Europe (excluding Russia). Eight countries are in this region, of which the River Danube forms the spinal column—Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece, most of them states which by Western standards must be accounted economically backward. There can be no hope of a stable and peaceful Europe so long as this area remains in the depressed condition which, before the war, enabled Germany to achieve there an economic hegemony which has proved one of the main buttresses of Nazi aggression. Purely political machinery will not provide the necessary strength unless it is backed by a powerful and balanced economy, for as the present struggle has amply proved, military power must rest upon an industrial basis.

The comparatively primitive economy of the greater part of Central and Southeastern Europe does not stem from a lack of natural resources. On the contrary, this area has been better endowed by nature than either Western Europe or Central Europe proper. As a whole it grows a surplus of food, and its agricultural production can reasonably be expected to increase when its farming methods are brought to the level of efficiency prevailing in other parts of the Continent. This region also produces a large surplus of timber, hemp, and flax and some supplies of wool and silk. It is plentifully supplied with minerals, in 1937 producing 26 per cent of the world's bauxite, 45 per cent of the magnesite, 24.7 per cent of the chrome ore (if Turkey is included), 9.8 per cent of the antimony, 7.6 per cent of the zinc ore, 6.7 per cent of the lead ore, 1.7 per cent of the copper ore, 5 per cent of the pyrites, 4.3 per cent of the coal, 2.6 per cent of the mineral oil, and 1.5 per cent of the iron ore. But the whole area in this year had only a 6 per cent share in total world trade.

Although Central and Southeastern Europe achieved progress in some lines after the last war, the region's economic structure remained notoriously unbalanced. No part of Europe was more seriously affected by the world-wide depression after 1929. The crisis followed a vast influx of direct and indirect foreign credits which had created an illusion of prosperity but had done little to correct the basic instability of the regional economy. Before any constructive program for the future can be formulated, the causes of this structural weakness must be discovered.

Was the depression that racked Southeastern Europe during the thirties due to lack of cooperation between the several states or was it merely a part of an unstable world situation? After 1918 this whole area faced the necessity of two major adjustments—to the radical changes in political boundary lines and systems which followed the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire and to the simultaneous major new developments in world economy. But these adjustments were delayed, and little had been done by 1930 to absorb the shock of the international financial crisis. An underdeveloped and poorly organized agriculture, the economic mainstay of the region and the chief source of exports, could not withstand the impact of world-wide surpluses of farm products. At the same time the practical cessation of overseas emigration closed an important outlet for the overpopulated villages. The isolation of Russia from the currents of foreign trade was another unfavorable influence, and the rise of Nazism, in addition to exercising an adverse political influence on many of these states, imposed on countries that were closely linked to Germany economically and trying to find markets for their agricultural surpluses the necessity of remolding their production to conform with the demands of an autarchic war economy.

Such adverse external factors are not to be ignored, but part of the responsibility for the difficulties of the different countries must be assigned to their economic and political nationalism. Particularly after 1931 this took the form of direct administrative protection, promoting new emphasis on agriculture in some parts, in others over-hasty industrialization. But we must not forget that during this period the big and wealthy credi-

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tor countries were also pursuing a policy of intensified protection. It was up to these countries to make the pattern for the world's trade policy, and it could not be expected that small and undeveloped debtor nations would take the initiative in the opposite direction. Even a customs union among the states of Central and Southeastern Europe could not have provided a real solution of the crisis; it could only have mitigated its effects.

The fall in prices of farm commodities for which the agricultural states had to find markets in competition with cheaper overseas production was the real problem. In turn the agricultural crisis directly affected Czecho-Slovakian and Austrian industry, which were dependent on consumers in the rural areas. The solution of the problem seemed to be not merely the opening of foreign markets but some kind of preferential treatment, since competition with exports from overseas was impossible without a major readjustment of the cost structure of the region's agriculture. This was the chief aim of the agrarian bloc of Central Europe created in 1932. At the conference at Stresa in the same year this bloc attempted to persuade the importing countries of Western Europe to grant tariff preferences to the agricultural surpluses of the countries in the Danubian basin, but it failed. Then Nazi Germany entered the picture and by using new and deceitful methods of economic penetration was able to force upon these countries, one by one, the adoption of economic policies designed solely to serve the German war machine. The agrarian bloc was not strong enough to form a united front for dealing with Germany.

Now that Hitler has a firm military grip on this whole region, we may assume that new measures of exploitation have been adopted regardless of the malajustments that may result. We know that the production of various raw materials for which there is a desperate need in Germany is being pushed regardless of cost, while at the same time industries adapted to the needs of local consumers are being either shut down or shifted to the manufacture of war goods. Thus the lack of balance between agriculture and industry within the region is becoming still more pronounced.

After the war, even if the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe can be drawn into a single economic unit, it is not to be supposed that they will be able to solve the problems of reconstruction in isolation. A solution will have to be sought within a framework of total European reconstruction and through reintegration with the world economy. Success will depend on a revival of the international division of production and the promotion of a universal economy of expansion.

One factor not to be neglected is that this part of Europe is not socially and economically homogeneous. Before the war, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, and western Poland had achieved an economic development comparable to that of Western Europe, and up to 1938 Germany had not succeeded in expanding its economic influence over these countries. Czecho-Slovakia, by virtue of its well-balanced industrial-agricultural structure and the importance of its foreign trade, could be classed with Sweden, Switzerland, or Belgium. Out of the total population gainfully occupied, agriculture accounted for 34.2 per cent in Czecho-Slovakia and 32 per cent in Austria, which compared with 28.9 per cent in Germany. In contrast, we find 53 per cent in agriculture in Hungary, 54 per cent in Greece, 76 per cent in Poland, 75 per cent in Yugoslavia, 78 per cent in Rumania, and 81 per cent in Bulgaria. And with this concentration on the land went low crop yields and high birth rates, leading to land hunger and overcrowding.

This is one of the biggest problems for which a solution must be found. Mass emigration is no answer, nor is intensification of agriculture an adequate one, though this is one of the goals to be sought. A shift in the crop structure will be necessary, with a view to taking advantage of new scientific trends toward the use of farm products as industrial raw materials. Merely to multiply the output of wheat and other cereals, even at lower cost, would do little to improve the peasants' standard of living. A prerequisite for improved farming is a great development in popular education. Scandinavian countries have shown what progress can be achieved, even under unfavorable conditions of soil and climate, by a rural population trained to scientific methods. Moreover, only among an enlightened peasantry can there be much hope of the kind of cooperative organization which has today become almost essential to a prosperous agriculture. But social reforms of this character must take root with painful slowness unless there is a high degree of international cooperation.

The development of a modern agricultural economy will not by itself relax the pressure of population on the land. Industry also must be built up on a large scale if the problems of Central and Southeastern Europe are to be solved. This does not mean the indiscriminate creation and protection of industries. On the other hand, the argument that production costs are higher than abroad cannot be accepted as a final barrier to industrial development. Even with a lower output per worker than in more advanced countries, the productivity of labor, taking the economy as a whole, will be raised in comparison with the very limited productivity resulting from existing agricultural methods. This will justify a certain degree of tariff protection for new industries, and for a limited period of readjustment Western Europe may reasonably be asked to give preferences to the farm exports of the Danubian lands.

Because of the present low density of railroads, highways, and utilities in this region any program of intensive economic development will call for huge invest-

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ments in public works. Here again is an opportunity for international planning which will bring together the surplus savings of the advanced industrial states and the capital needs of backward countries.

After the war we may expect that the foreign trade of Central and Southeastern Europe will increase in volume while changing in structure. There will be smaller imports of consumer goods but larger imports of overseas raw materials, of high-quality industrial products—especially capital goods—and of colonial products; and while there will be less mass export of agricultural products, there will be larger exports of specialized crops, semi-finished goods, and raw materials. Bilateral trade—exploited by the Nazis—will be replaced by multilateral trade, and the expansion of inter-Danubian commerce as the result of diversified production will strengthen the position of the industrial countries in this area. The danger of economic dependence on one country, such as Germany, will be substantially reduced.

Assuming general agreement on basic economic policies at the peace conference, what are the essentials of a program for the economic reconstruction of the depressed area with which we are now concerned? It would be wise to insert in the peace treaties some provisions forbidding any return to pre-war economic nationalism, for without close cooperation there can be no hope of peaceful prosperity. With this principle established, it is then possible to consider what form of political organization will best meet the economic requirements of the region. The several constituent countries are not economically complementary to an extent which would make this a persuasive argument for their integration in one political unit. Moreover, such a transformation would require a much greater similarity in social structure and political ideology than actually exists. We dare not overlook incongruities which would contribute to the degeneration of an outwardly strong political entity.

It will be more appropriate, then, to begin by forming two or three federations, linked together for specific economic purposes in such a way as to make possible a gradual enlargement of the sphere of collaboration. One such unit might include Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary*—and possibly even Rumania—because in spite of many differences there are important similarities in the economic structure of these countries. Another unit could comprise the Balkan countries, which face common problems of population and agriculture. In private enterprise maximum efficiency is often attained by the medium-sized rather than the giant concern. A similar principle applies also to the organization of nations, especially in a system of planned economy with expanding government interference. For in an unwieldy economic unit government planners are likely to overlook their long-range functions in favor of bureaucratic interference in the daily life of business. Moreover, the greater flexibility of medium-sized units makes possible adjustment to changing conditions.

What must be found, then, is a political form, backed by popular consent in the nations concerned, that will bring real progress to this part of Europe. The freedom, prosperity, and security of these countries, together with the promotion of democracy among them, demand a general improvement in their standard of living and closer ties with the main stream of world economy. Unless these things can be achieved, no political organization of a permanent nature will be possible.

* Needless to say, Hungary would first have to undergo a profound change from feudalism to political and economic democracy.

Invasion via Norway

BY GUNNAR LEISTIKOW

TALK in London about a possible invasion of the European continent "on a limited scale" is making the Swedes extremely uneasy. Nowhere is there any real prospect of this kind of limited second front except in northern Norway. But an attack there, the Swedes fear, would be likely to put an end to their cherished neutrality and pitch them into the war. Surrounded by the Germans on all sides, with United Nations submarines disrupting their iron-ore trade across the Baltic, and with mysterious, probably Nazi, planes dropping Russian bombs near King Gustav's summer residence, they are distinctly between the devil and the deep blue sea. Should the Allies choose to secure the route to Murmansk by smashing the bases from which the enemy now launches his attacks on Russian-bound convoys, the neutral position of Sweden would in all probability become untenable.

Behind the nervousness of the Swedes is the military fact that northern Norway cannot be effectively defended by the Germans from southern Norway but only from northern Sweden. The three Norwegian counties north of Trondheim—Nordland, Troms, and Finmark—are almost completely isolated from the rest of Norway. There is no connecting railroad, and the only highway is the solitary road built by the Germans during the occupation. The district, however, is easily accessible from Sweden. Narvik, the biggest city in northern Norway, is the terminal of a Swedish railroad which connects the Norwegian port not only with the famous iron mines near Kiruna but also with Gellivara, from which two major railroads run south to Stockholm.

The British navy showed in June, 1940, that Narvik can be reduced from the sea. The task would probably be much harder now, but it seems unlikely that the Nazis have been able to make the port impregnable to attack by a resolute and daring invader. If Narvik falls, the

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rest of northern Norway will be practically cut off. The only line of communications for the Germans, unless they go through Sweden, would be the circuitous and difficult road through Finland to Petsamo. It is clear, then, that if Germany chooses to defend northern Norway it will have to make use of the Swedish railroad. That is why Sweden fears that if the United Nations choose this locale for their second front it will be confronted by a German ultimatum within a few hours.

What will Sweden do in such circumstances? Considering the feeling that has developed among the people since the occupation of Norway, it is an excellent guess that Sweden will fight, especially if it sees immediate prospect of help. When I left Sweden fifteen months ago I was assured in well-informed circles that there was no difference of opinion in the Cabinet on what to do if the Germans initiated their Russian campaign with an ultimatum to Sweden. Speeches of Cabinet ministers since then show that the government has not become any more complaisant. Thus the opening of a second front in Norway might well make Sweden a belligerent on the side of the United Nations.

Swedish military men at that time were prepared to lose southern Sweden in the event of a German attack. The major problem was how to stave off an eastward drive by the strong tank forces which the Germans had assembled in and around Oslo with the probable purpose of cutting Sweden in two just south or just north of Stockholm. On the other hand, the Swedish military felt confident of taking Narvik by land and thus establishing an outlet to the sea. Their main concern was the doubt that help from the British would be in sight once they had taken Narvik.

In the year that has passed, the military situation of Sweden has worsened. The country would now have to face attack from the east also, by parachute troops and air-borne infantry from German-occupied Estonia, if not from Finland. On the other hand, if the showdown with Germany is precipitated by Allied landings in northern Norway, Sweden need not fear having to keep watch on the Narvik strand alone.

Germany's problem would be, first, to establish contact between troops landing in southern Sweden and the Nazi garrison at Oslo, and, second, to secure the rail line from Malmo through Gothenburg to Oslo. It would probably leave central Sweden and Stockholm aside for a while in order to concentrate on the railroads linking the southern half of the country with Ostersund, the strategical center of Swedish Norrland, from which Trondheim could be protected against surprises from the land side. This would be quite a job for the German panzers and parachutists, who would have to protect their exposed flank from counter-attack by the main body of the well-trained and extremely well-equipped Swedish army of more than 500,000 men.

Thus the opening of a second front in Norway might easily develop into prolonged fighting all along the Scandinavian peninsula. It would be a race against time both for the United Nations and the Axis, and it would offer a chance to separate the war-weary Finns from their fateful attachment to Hitler. But whatever is to be done must be done quickly. If the Russians go down in defeat and the Germans are able to withdraw whole armies from the eastern front, the Swedes might think twice about pitting their strength against Adolf Hitler.

In the Wind

SECRETARY OF STATE HULL has served notice on Elmer Davis that the State Department is to be considered out of bounds for the activities of the Office of War Information.

AS PART OF HIS CHARGE to a jury, Judge Joe Ben Jackson of the Ocmulgee (Georgia) Circuit Superior Court saw fit last week to add the following judicial guidance: "I deserve to be reelected. I want the job and I think I should have it as my indorsement term." During the course of the trial the Judge, a Talmadge appointee, urged the jurors to support Roosevelt, Talmadge, and himself in the "cause of defeating the enemy."

THE INCREASING COCKINESS of the military in Washington is exemplified by a remark made to Donald Nelson by Lieutenant General Somervell, commander of the army's supply services. When Nelson refused to accede to a War Department request, Somervell said he liked to see Nelson in Washington and regretted that the war-production chief was so determined to cut short his tenure of office.

A MEXICAN READER of *The Nation* reports that for the first time an issue of the magazine has been subjected to the scissors of the censor. The offending article was an editorial on Odell Waller expressing the opinion that his execution represented a lost battle on the home front.

FALSE RUMORS are circulating in New York to the effect that *The Nation* and the *New Republic* are planning a merger.

THE 1922 COMMITTEE, composed of Tory M. P.'s who are not in the government, was responsible for getting J. B. Priestley off the air, according to the *New Statesman and Nation*. The same group is now trying to bar Julian Huxley, C. E. M. Joad, and Harold J. Laski from broadcasting to Europe and America.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

An Open Letter on Critics and Criticism

DEAR MARGARET MARSHALL: When you first asked me to send you something for this page I sat down and wrote about 2,500 words on Literary Scholarship and Literature. Being, like most journalists, thrifty, I used some ideas I had used before in a speech to an academic audience, and I was pleased enough with what I wrote to put it in a file from which it may some day be disinterred. But it occurred to me that though the essay embodied approximately what I wanted to say to one audience, it was not quite what I wanted to say to another. I was outlining what I considered the very narrow limits within which scholarship could be of use to literature, but I deliberately left the general impression that criticism, on the other hand, could profitably illuminate the darkest corners of the mystery of art. The truth is, however, that I think critics quite as likely as scholars to overestimate the importance of what they accomplish, and since *The Nation* is primarily a journal of criticism I should prefer to say something about that.

In recent years criticism has certainly been taking itself with a new seriousness. After scorning the easy impressionism of the late nineteenth century, it now scorns also the easy Freudianism of the twenties, and is showing signs of scorning only a little less openly the easy Marxism of the thirties. The science of aesthetics has come into fashion again. Poets, many of whom seem to be more interested in criticism than in poetry, have got so far from the old romantic attitude toward their art that they argue at length such metaphysical questions as the cognitive or non-cognitive nature of poetry. But they are especially interested in the secrets of technique and generally prefer to examine a writer, especially if he be a poet, word by word or, at most, half-line by half-line. In *The Nation* itself "sprung rhythm" —and with all deference to Hopkins it is a singularly repellent phrase—has recently been getting an amount of space roughly equivalent to that devoted to the Battle of the Atlantic. And when the Seven Types of Ambiguity can all be discovered in two or three words, then the half-line is admired with all the enthusiasm of Polonius for mobled queen."

But I wonder whether the New Seriousness isn't reducing itself to a New Pedantry. Mark Van Doren was telling me recently of his experience with a cooperative volume on the poetry of Yeats. It was, he said, careful, learned, intelligent, and ingenious. He read it with great respect for the authors. But it left him with the troubled impression that it was impossible to read Yeats with any profit unless one knew more about him, about the history of poetry, and about a lot of other things, than anyone except the authors of the essays was at all likely to know. At about the same time an enthusiastic dissector of poetry by the methods of semantics said to me with an air of triumph, "At least I have shown that it is not easy to read a poem." But I wonder if to carry that conviction is to perform any very useful service for poetry. I have the impression that at least ninety-nine out of a hundred contemporary readers accept it already—accept it, indeed, so absolutely that they have no intention of trying. I wonder if the answer said to have been made by Victor Hugo to the lady who asked him if it was difficult to write an epic is not equally applicable to the reading of good poetry: "Madam, it is either easy or impossible." The early readers of Chaucer and Shakespeare and Milton and Pope and Byron and Tennyson found it easy. Is it our ultimate aim to make it impossible?

A good deal of fun used to be made by critics of those academic courses in Shakespeare which devoted most of their time to tracing one by one the etymologies of the words he used as they turned up in the passages being read. The objection was not that the etymologies were false or even that the history of words was in itself a profitless subject. The argument was simply that it was a subject of interest chiefly to a group of specialists, and that when Shakespeare was studied primarily as someone who afforded a text for philological dissection, the student learned nothing about the great poet, however much he might learn about etymology. Now I grant that the ambiguities and the sprung rhythms of a poet may reveal more of his art than a study of the history of his words would. I also admit that the study of such things is a perfectly legitimate, and to many an interesting, one. I deny, however, that it is essential to the most important kind of appreciation of literature, and I would even insist that it is quite as likely as philology or the study of "sources" and "influences" to inhibit in the too self-conscious reader the effect that a work of art should produce. The best reader is the one in whom the author has stimulated the thoughts and emotions he intended to communicate, but that reader is certainly not necessarily the one who is most acutely and most perfectly aware of what makes the wheels go round. When the seven ambiguities have been disentangled and spread out on the dissecting board they have lost their magic power.

I say nothing—though I might say a good deal—about the additional fact that even when the sprung rhythm and the seven ambiguities really are there they are seldom *all* that is there, though they do tend to convince the complacent analyst that the admired line or the admired passage is *nothing but* a certain rhythm and a certain set of associations. I should like to go at least as far with Van Wyck Brooks as to insist that a really great writer is a Great Man Writing, as well as an adroit technician, and this the admirers of technique are likely to forget. But leaving all this aside, it seems to me that if we are talking not about how accurate or how interesting literary analysis may be as a subject for specialists but simply about how much service it renders to literature, then the new seriousness is, if anything, rather less useful than, to take an extreme case, the mere whooping it up for this or that unknown writer which such men as Huneker used to do.

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Recently I read in *The Nation* a very good review, by a very able critic, devoted to a new book on Dickens. But in the course of it the author said something to the effect that it was high time criticism was doing something for the author of "Pickwick" and "Our Mutual Friend." The implication seemed to be that if criticism didn't do something pretty soon, poor Dickens would be lost to the world. The truth is, however, that if criticism neglects him it will be too bad for criticism but no great loss for Dickens, who will continue to be read whether critics do or do not discover what seems to them an adequate justification for the interest which he continues to evoke. To talk about the necessity of doing something for him is like anxiously calling attention to the growing neglect of Niagara Falls or the Grand Canyon. Criticism needs literature. But in all seriousness and speaking as one who, in various ways, made his living for more than twenty years by writing about books and plays, I doubt that literature very much needs either the critic or the scholar.

All along I have, of course, been assuming that criticism and scholarship both have it as their ultimate aim to do something for literature; that both are rather elaborate means taken to accomplish what the eighteenth century would have called "the diffusion of polite letters," and are not simply a highly technical and rather remote subject for detached specialists. But perhaps this assumption is wrong. Perhaps many critics are, on the contrary, as was suggested by something I read only a few weeks ago, anxious chiefly to frighten off as much of the potential audience as possible, very much in the spirit of the lady editor of a then moribund periodical who remarked to me brightly, "You see we have succeeded in whittling away our subscription list until the magazine reaches only those who are genuinely interested in aesthetics."

In any event, the article which raised my doubts, an essay-review in a large metropolitan daily, concerned itself with a recently published study of the audience for good music on the radio. The study was said to reveal that a very large number of listeners to such music were not properly prepared for the music they were hearing—just as undoubtedly most readers of Yeats's poetry are not properly prepared—and that though they enjoyed it, it was almost invariably only as a series of disjointed passages rather than as an architectural whole. No doubt this is true; in me at least the statement merely evoked the unsensational reflection that half a loaf is better than either no bread or bad cake. But the author of the study and the commentator seemed indignantly agreed that something should be done and done quickly to discourage the playing of good music on the radio and thus to protect Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms from unqualified listeners who should be given only what was fit for them.

What proportion, I wonder, of the audiences which for more than two centuries kept Shakespeare alive on the stage understood everything that a qualified critic could find in his works. How much better off would they and literature have been had they been convinced by semantic critics that it is not easy to understand "Hamlet" and that accordingly it ought to be protected from them? What, in other words, is the best base for great art, a broad base of eager readers and hearers or a select coterie capable of analyzing the seven ambiguities and of knowing a sprung rhythm when they see one? If serious criticism tends to encourage the choice of the second alternative, then I hope that serious criticism will be read by no one except serious critics.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

The Martyrdom of Poland

THE NEW ORDER IN POLAND. By Simon Segal. Alfred A. Knopf. $3.

POLISH scholars used to disagree as to the causes which led to the repeated partitions of their country. The Krakow school of historians upheld the theory of inner decay; the Warsaw school maintained that external aggression was responsible. The so-called Scientific Institute set up in honor of Hitler's birthday settled the controversy by explaining that the Jews were to blame for the downfall of the old Polish state.

This explanation provided at least an excuse for the persecution of the Jews; the Nazis have not bothered to give a reason for the treatment which the "inferior Polish race" has had to endure. Not only Jews but Poles have been expelled from the area incorporated in the Reich. From Gdynia the Nazis removed the entire population of 130,000 and from Posen one-third of the inhabitants in order to make room for German colonists; the remaining Poles were degraded "to the status of a lower class." The 82,000 people that have been tortured and killed during the two years of occupation include Gentiles as well as Jews. Food rations for Germans are twice as high as they are for Poles. Education being unnecessary for an "inferior race," all universities and high schools have been closed. Ritual slaughter has been forbidden because under German sovereignty "cruelty of any kind to animals is considered impossible." Yet cruelty to human beings seems to have been possible, and not only to Jews, as is illustrated by the cases of a seventy-nine-year-old Protestant and a seventy-five-year-old Catholic bishop.

The economic policy of Poland is determined exclusively by the necessities of the Reich. Cheap Polish labor is taken to Germany to enable German exports to compete on the world market. Since Poles can be drafted for any kind of work, their condition differs little from that of the Jews, who are subject to forced labor.

At the beginning of the occupation not only Polish but German and Czech Jews were to be dumped into the Lublin "reservation"; later on ghettos were established in six cities along with all the abominations that the term ghetto implies.

Mr. Segal's picture of present-day Poland—both the incorporated area and the region now termed *Nebenland* (annex country)—is all the more gruesome for being pruned of sensationalism. Here are the facts, conscientiously gathered and carefully sifted, about the torture and exploitation of Poland and the Poles. Here also is a documented picture of the fate which is in store for other European colonies of Greater Germany.

I should disagree with the author only at one point. Like other scholars aiming at objectivity, Mr. Segal terms Nazi ruthlessness and the manifestations of the berserk revolu-

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tion a "system of government." The systematic perpetration of atrocities is not a form of administration; and it sounds as if the author were being ironical when he points to the difficulty of determining the "legal character of the Government General" and when he speaks of "the principle of two judicial systems." For obvious reasons the Nazis prefer to call tyranny, violence, and terrorism a New Order or a totalitarian form of government, but there is no reason why we should not call a spade a spade. RUSTEM VAMBERY

Of Our Own Time

THE GARDEN IS POLITICAL. By John Malcolm Brinnin. The Macmillan Company. $1.75.

IT WAS the writer's privilege to choose a manuscript of Mr. Brinnin's for one of the Avery Hopwood awards which he received, significantly enough, for three successive years, and it is a tribute to the living quality of this verse that familiar poems offer renewed pleasure. Even obviously occasional pieces have a durable toughness. Here is a young man aware at once of his world and of the instrument with which he calibrates it. He has learned most of the necessary lessons: from the now aging masters, the care for the exact epithet and a reverberant concision of statement; from their influential heirs, that ethical concern which compels him to see the garden as political. Beyond that, they have taught him, what is more valuable, to take no narrow view of man's fate, but to envisage the social order in the setting of the larger natural order which nurtures and challenges it.

The book opens with a handful of pieces on political subjects, while each of the remaining four sections includes some personal and some social poetry. Even in the love lyrics the political theme is sounded, giving additional weight to the title poem. And sensitive though Mr. Brinnin is to the meanness and horror of our time, the dominant mood is one of hope. Indeed, he does not always escape the tyranny of a youthful optimism. The value of these poems is not their effort to disperse the dark night of our present fear. Their value is that here sincere feeling informs technical alertness. Consider the peculiar fitness of the opening lines of the Address to the Refugees:

> We have the statue for it—Liberty,
> Whose classic vulgar hands invite you Home. . . .

Note the metaphors in A Letter, with the startling excellence of this image:

> If no one dressed in seaweed lurches in
> Like some surprised Ophelia with green hands,

followed by the beautiful placidity of:

> There is communication on the earth
> As quiet as the opening of a wing.

Examine the condensed writing on the Visiting Card for Emily, and then go back to some more recent and more public history, like Cadillac Square, or to one of the most moving and least ambitious pieces, Rowing in Lincoln Park, and see how in each there is the strength of feeling, the insight, the tenderness that illuminate the poem. Mr. Brinnin's is not the more accessible kind of poetry. It is difficult partly because of the privacy of certain references, which is a fault, partly because the poet telescopes his meaning with a rapidity that bewilders, which is the defect of a virtue.

In spite of a buoyancy marking certain pieces which seems somewhat unreal today, his is essentially contemporary work. This is not only because some of the finest passages deal with airports and travel by plane, but because of the nature of the garden that the poet cultivates. The contemporaneity of the book is also due in part to his gift for finding the unobtrusive half-rhyme and for introducing interesting irregularities into the meter. But chiefly this poetry is of our own time because it is written by a man who is young in this time, and who, having the eager awareness, the hungry spirit of youth, has set down for us what his heart grieves over, what his imagination hopes for, all the while conveying faithfully what his keen senses report concerning this our world. BABETTE DEUTSCH

Post-War Probings

THE COMING SHOWDOWN. By Carl Dreher. Little, Brown and Company. $3.

BOOM OR BUST. By Blair Moody. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. $2.50.

THE title of "The Coming Showdown" does insufficient justice to the contents. Dreher's book is much more than a discussion of what kind of world we may have in the future. More than half the book deals with past economic and political crises when showdowns should have come about but didn't. It presents a graphic picture of what business as usual consisted of during and after World War I. Still more important, it gives some of the current facts that show how business as usual has affected our participation in World War II. Against this background are placed fundamental problems concerning America's future. Dreher believes that collectivism of some sort is inevitable, that the question is whether it will be a fascist or a democratic collectivism, and he argues persuasively for the desirability of the latter.

Moody is more the journalist, less the thinker. "Boom or Bust" reviews the major policies of the pre-war New Deal and calls for a bigger, better post-war version that will take fewer zigzags and be more diplomatic. Full employment, based upon more government spending, and a better distribution of a higher national income are his goals. No attempt is made at independent analysis; the emphasis is upon popular explanation of the major ideas held by the more progressive economists and administrators in Washington.

Neither book is a definitive statement of the domestic issues facing us today or after the war. "Boom or Bust" will serve as quick, easy reading for someone who wants to learn some of the fundamentals of New Deal thought. "The Coming Showdown," on the other hand, is a good book for the more thoughtful to read carefully and then to brood over. A significant difference between the two books is that Moody seems to think this is a world where worth-while plans are all that is needed to get the proper things done. Dreher, knowing a hundred-fold more about planning, is aware of its limitations and fully recognizes the role played by social conflicts. BERTRAM M. GROSS

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IN BRIEF

ALL THE TRUMPETS SOUNDED. By W. G. Hardy. Coward-McCann. $2.75.

Probably no Biblical figure is more suggestive to the fictional imagination than Moses. Mr. Hardy's long and circumstantial life of the Jewish leader is especially engaging in the section that deals with the proud young Egyptian prince as yet unaware of his mission. A curious provincialism in the prose and in the treatment of the female characters lowers the intensity of an interesting story.

PLUME ROUGE. By John Upton Terrell. The Viking Press. $2.75.

If Mr. Terrell's novel about the opening of the West were less burdened with literary aspiration it would be a better novel. The material is there, and Mr. Terrell seems to know it thoroughly. But nobody in this story asks a straight question or gets a straight answer, the complexity of the characters seems to spring from the author's ambitions for them and not from themselves, and the action is advanced with a kind of persistent indirection that is rather wearisome. Placed between the chapters —a pointless device, and the publishers should have been firm about it—is a poetic counterpoint to the main narrative, set in different type.

HIGH STAKES. By Curt Riess. G. P. Putnam's Sons. $2.50.

Nazi espionage in America is the subject, the FBI is the hero, and Mr. Riess states clearly that the characters in his novel are *not* wholly fictitious, nor the similarity to persons living or dead coincidental. The result is a thriller that owes its excitement more to the timeliness of its revelations than to the creative talents of its author.

FORWARD THE NATION. By Donald Culross Peattie. G. P. Putnam's Sons. $2.50.

This brief fictionized account of the Lewis and Clark expedition is worth reading by anyone who hasn't looked into the Journals themselves. Mr. Peattie rightly makes a heroine of the Indian girl, Sacajawea, who guided the explorers across two-thirds of the continent. Because his narrative of a great exploration is so generally sound and readable, one can overlook the occasional platitudinous heroics that mar his prose and even forgive the amateurish attempt to set off Napoleon and Josephine—representing futile pomp and destructive ambition—against Thomas Jefferson, Lewis and Clark, and Sacajawea—representing vision and courage.

RECORDS

VICTOR'S June list included a first recording (Set 901, $2.63) of Schubert's Rondo Op. 70 for piano and violin. This is a small-scale work, but in the slow introduction one hears the dramatic force, and here and in the rondo itself the melodic loveliness, the harmonic freedom, the rhythmic exuberance of the great works on larger scale. It is recorded by Hephzibah and Yehudi Menuhin; and though Yehudi's playing is more straightforward and therefore more acceptable than usual, it hasn't the incisiveness of phrasing and rhythm that causes Hephzibah's playing to dominate in effect even though poor balance in the performance or the recording causes Yehudi's to predominate in volume. I should mention that I am speaking of what came off the records on a five-year old Magnavox Symphony phonograph with a markedly limited range and a heavy pickup, which I must suppose was different from what the sound of the music and the surfaces would be on a wide-range machine with a sensitive, light pickup.

Newly recorded also, I believe, are the three Strauss waltzes on Victor's July list (Set 907, $3.68)—the unfamiliar and charming "Liebeslieder" and "Morgenblätter," the well known "Du und du" from "Die Fledermaus," which is one of the best. They are well performed—the first two by the Vienna Philharmonic under Krauss, the second by the same orchestra under Kleiber. And they sounded well recorded on the Magnavox Symphony.

Also I have at last heard Victor's February set (867, $5.52) of Shostakovitch's Symphony No. 6 recorded by Stokowski with the Philadelphia Orchestra. The work has two fast movements of the usual Shostakovitch hubbub—the melodically and harmonically distorted grimacing and nose-thumbing carried to diffuse lengths by pretentious fluency. And these are preceded by a slow first movement in which Stokowski or Koussevitzky may hear profundity, but in which I hear only an attempt at profundity pushing itself to diffuse lengths again by means of a mere ability to keep sounds following sounds—one striking example of the intention, the method, the result being the long flute solo (on side 3, I believe). The performance seems good and sounded well recorded on the Magnavox Symphony.

One would suppose that with the present scarcity of materials Victor would avoid duplication of a work except where the duplicating performance is of outstanding importance and interest, as a Toscanini performance is. No such importance and interest explain the issuing of a new version of Dvorak's "New World" Symphony recorded by Iturbi with the Rochester Philharmonic (Set 899, $5.78). It is a performance with details that make me prefer the older Szell-Czech Philharmonic version, the recorded sound of which, on the Magnavox Symphony, is very good in its own way—with more body where the new version, on the same machine, gives indications of more spaciousness and brightness.

Victor also offers a new album (Set 893, $4.73) of piano pieces of Brahms played by Artur Rubinstein, at the same time as it withdraws one of the albums in which the pieces are better played by Bachaus. Bachaus did not record the *Rhapsody Op. 119 No. 4*, which Rubinstein, as it happens, plays very well. But of the others—the Rhapsody Op. 79 No. 1, the Intermezzi Op. 76 No. 7, Op. 117 Nos. 1 and 2, Op. 118 Nos. 2 and 6, Op. 119 No. 3—I prefer Bachaus's performances because he phrases them simply, whereas Rubinstein distorts the phrases with the mannered style in which he plays Chopin. The recorded sound of his performance is brighter.

B. H. HAGGIN

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BABETTE DEUTSCH, poet and critic, is the author of a book of verse entitled "One Part Love."

BERTRAM M. GROSS has contributed frequently to the *New Republic*, *Harper's*, and other magazines.

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RECENTLY PUBLISHED

The Diffusion of Science. By Jesse Lee Bennett. Johns Hopkins. $2.25.

Keep Them Human: The Young Child at Home. By C. Madeleine Dixon. John Day. $1.50.

India Today: The Background of Indian Nationalism. By W. E. Duffett, A. R. Hicks, and G. R. Parkin. John Day. $1.75.

Anthology of Canadian Poetry (English). Compiled by Ralph Gustafson. Penguin. 25 cents.

Strategic Materials and National Strength. By Harry N. Holmes, Macmillan. $1.75.

Fire in the Pacific. By Simon Harcourt-Smith. Knopf. $2.

See Here, Private Hargrove. By Marion Hargrove. Holt. $2.

The Truth About Ann. By Thomas Lennon. John Day. $2.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1941. Edited by Francis E. McMurtrie. Macmillan. $19.

Year of the Wild Boar: An American Woman in Japan. By Helen Mears. Lippincott. $2.75.

American Reveille: The United States at War. By Ward Morehouse. Putnam's. $2.50.

The Best Poems of 1941. Selected by Thomas Moult. Harcourt, Brace. $2.

Global War: An Atlas of World Strategy. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer and Marthe Rajchman. Morrow. $1.

The Latin American Republics: A History. By Dana Gardner Munro. Appleton-Century. $5.

Christianity in Peril. The New World Order and the Church. By Andrew R. Osborn. Oxford. $2.

Anthology of Magazine Verse for 1938-1942 and Yearbook of American Poetry. Edited by Alan F. Pater. Paebar. $10.

Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia. By Donald Pierson. Chicago. $4.50.

A History of Economic Thought. By Eric Roll. Prentice-Hall. $4. Revised Edition.

State Housing Agencies. By Dorothy Schaffter. Columbia. $7.50.

The Port of New Orleans. By Harold Sinclair. Doubleday, Doran. $3.50.

Religion in Colonial America. By William Warren Sweet. Scribner's. $3.

Turkey. By Barbara Ward. Oxford. $1.

The Golden Age of Colonial Culture. By Thomas J. Wertenbaker. New York University. $3.

The Growth of American Constitutional Law. By Benjamin F. Wright. Reynal and Hitchcock. $3.

The Coming Battle of Germany. By William B. Ziff. Duell, Sloan and Pearce. $2.50.

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Letters to the Editors

To Defeat Hamilton Fish

Dear Sirs: A committee known as the Independent Committee of the Twenty-sixth District has been formed to bring about the defeat of Hamilton Fish in the coming Congressional elections. It is composed of Democrats and Republicans and has a large membership in the three counties forming the district. It is not controlled or directed by either political party and will be guided in its actions solely by the desire to defeat Fish and to elect in his place a competent Congressman, regardless of party.

The committee has already distributed thousands of pieces of literature showing the record of Congressman Fish; it has delivered many radio addresses and expects to use the radio freely; it has held a number of meetings in homes in the district; and it is preparing through its Research Department carefully documented evidence of Fish's record which it intends to publish and make available to writers, speakers, publishers, candidates, and all who need such information. It is a people's movement and contains in its ranks representatives of the various interests in the Congressional district. It will need a substantial campaign fund; it will need helpers in the distribution of literature and the holding of meetings. In every way possible the cooperation of those who are interested is invited.

The committee's main office is now at 2 Cannon Street, Poughkeepsie, New York. After the primaries it expects to establish branches in various sections of the district and to make an aggressive fight.

JAMES H. CAUSEY, Chairman

Poughkeepsie, N. Y., July 23

On Revolution in Italy

Dear Sirs: In *The Nation* of June 20 Gaetano Salvemini, in his review of "Agent in Italy," agrees with the book's author that Italy will not drop out of the war by itself. "Such an event," says the author, "can be brought about by only two means. . . . One is invasion by the United Nations, which would be warmly welcomed and abetted by the mass of the people. The other is for Germany to be militarily defeated and Nazism destroyed. . . . There will be no revolution in Italy until peace comes again to Europe."

Many Americans seem to be very impatient for a revolution in Italy and to think that the Italians should revolt without delay if they want to regain the respect of the world. The Italian people already oppose the Fascist regime in many ways, and it is possible that an actual revolution will gradually develop. But to think that it is the Italians' duty to revolt now is nonsense. If the Italians are now prisoners of Hitler and Mussolini, this is not the fault of the Italian people alone. In his article World War III? in *The Nation* of June 20 Alvarez del Vayo wrote: "From the moment that fascism established itself in Italy there was in Europe a popular anti-fascist current strong enough to have forced the adoption at Geneva of a policy of resistance to violent and unilateral solutions of international problems. But the defenders of the existing economic order saw in fascism an effective means of creating a new balance of power against any possible advance of a democracy which might try to go too far." To expect the Italians to revolt now is like expecting the Spanish people to revolt against Franco after the latter received the support of all the governments in his fight against Spanish democracy; or like expecting the French people to revolt against Pétain when he enjoys the moral and material support of the United States.

I think that the Italians already deserve the respect of the world because, in spite of having been poisoned for twenty years by a fascism which has been kept alive and prosperous by the reactionaries of the whole world, they have behaved in this war as a civilized people.

As Salvemini says, the British and American governments still speak of making peace with the king or with the Italian army chiefs, thus showing the Italians that a revolution would be welcomed only if the people had no benefit from it. It seems to me that if we ask a people to revolt, we should make it clear that we are with them without reserve and will welcome their popular revolution as part of a people's war for a people's victory.

M. T. MAESTRO,
Italian News Editor
Columbia Broadcasting System

New York, July 21

A Thai Asks Us to Hurry

Dear Sirs: My unlucky homeland has lost its democratic freedom. Our democratic regime was inaugurated on June 24, 1932, by a group of earnest Buddhists, aided of course by native men at arms. During the brief glorious period of less than ten years, up to December 8, 1941, the masses became deeply impressed with the unfamiliar yet comfortable notion. Now the destiny of all Thais is dark.

The gallant Thai minister in Washington, M. R. Seni Pramoj, after the arrival of a short communiqué from Bangkok to the effect that Japanese forces had entered Thailand told the people of this country of his intention to strive for his country's independence regardless of any eventuality—be it death. That was his stimulating action on December 10, 1941, just two days after the government had capitulated.

The hundred-odd Thai students in America were chilled by the gruesome news when the legation circular reached their hands. It is not at all a pleasant feeling to know that one may become a man without a country permanently.

The Thai minister kept his word when he refused officially to deliver the declaration of war against the United States as instructed by the puppet Bangkok government. The Thais in the United States are still free to help the righteous Allies. They are still free to face torture and slow death as long as the Japanese aggressors are at large.

Shortly before the departure of the Gripsholm, a final warning came through the royal Thai legation at Berne, Switzerland, with the following Japanized message: "Kindly communicate to all concerned that by Premier's order Thai subjects are to return Thailand on first exchange vessel. Penalty for disobedience in official case is instant dismissal from the service; in ordinary case they will lose their Thai nationality and will be barred forever from entering Thailand."

Now we know where we stand. Now we know where we are heading for. Will it be asking too much, if I beg the American fighters to speed up a little bit, before my mother gets too old and too familiar with the hissing sound?

M. C. CHETNA

Ithaca, N. Y., July 20

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